Naval War College Review
Volume 2
Number 7 September

Article 3

1949

Turkey
Walter L. Wright Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review
Recommended Citation
Wright, Walter L. Jr. (1949) "Turkey," Naval War College Review: Vol. 2 : No. 7 , Article 3.
Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol2/iss7/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu.
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TURKEY
A lecture delivered by

Professor Walter L. Wright, Jr.
at the Naval War College
February 23, 1949

Gentlemen, it is a great pleasure to have the person who in

troduces you as a lecturer not only state the text on which you

are to speak but also the conclusion at which you are going to ar

rive.

This is not entirely astonishing to me because I am aware

that the Straits of the Bosporous and the Dardanelles have been

househO'ld words in the Navy Department ever since 1800, when

Admiral Bainbridge very unwillingly sailed the

Washington

up

through those straits and passed the batteries on the Dardanelles.

To carry you back for a moment to the days of sail (which

I understand is not always unwelcome to sailors), Bainbridge was

ordered by the Dey of Algiers to take a special emissary to his
overlord, the Sultan of Turkey. The Dey threatened to blow the

Washington

out of the sea with his shore batteries if Bainbridge

refused. He therefore started under duress flying the Algerian

flag, but as soon as he got out of range of the batteries he
sent a sailor up the mast and took the flag down, and there

after he sailed under the Stars and Stripes. When he got to the

entrance of the Dardanelles, where there were great forts on
either side, he knew that a strange and unknown flag would be
fired upon.

He wasn't going to strike the American flag so he

had to find a solution. The solution was this: he headed straight

in toward the anchorage near one of these forts, and as he
The late Professor Wright spent many years in the Near East
as an instructor in the American University of Beirut, Syria, and as
President of the American College for Girls and Robert College, both
in Istanbul, Turkey.
The Naval War College takes this opportunity of expressing its
deep regret at the death of Professor Wrizht. May 16th. 1949.
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went in he began furling sail and firing a salute. Of course the
salute was fired with black powder and there was plenty of smoke.
As soon as he had a good smoke screen in the air, he began un
furling sail, and the first thing the Turkish artillerymen on shore
knew, the Washington under full sail was emerging from her
cloud of smoke, already out of range of their guns, which were
in fixed emplacements and couldn't be shifted as the ship moved.
So, to American sailors, these are familiar waters-the Darda

nelles, the Sea of Marmara, and the Bosporous. You don't need,
therefore, to be told a great deal about the general strategic
importance of Turkey, which is the possessor of these narrow
seas, these straits leading from the Black Sea into the Aegean.
There has been a good deal of talk since 1939 to the ef

fect that these straits have lost their importance; that the range
of air bombardment is such that the Aegean Sea in itself is a suf
ficiently narrow area to make the use of naval forces in any great
number impossible, and there is, of course, a good deal of truth in

this statement. Certainly the Aegean Sea, which is nowhere more
than two hundred miles wide, offers very little opportunity for
maneuver when you can get an air force out there any hour of the
day. On the other hand, the crucial point within this narrow area
has simply been lengthened by the addition of air force and the pos
sibility of air attack. The tightest point in the long narrow passage
is still the straits leading from the Black Sea to the Marmara and
into the Aegean.

I suppose that it's appropriate to mention one major
strategic point which I will refer to later. From the point of view
of those who are most concerned with the straits, their major im
portance formerly was that behind the straits lay a body of water
large enough for the training of a massive fleet, which might, if

the straits were opened to it, emerge fully prepared for battle in
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That was the basic

consideration, undoubtedly, in British naval thinking in the nine

teenth century. I think it's still true. It's still true, but it is also

true that, in 'order to have this facility, a power which might build
such a fleet (which might be at the present time the Soviet Union)

would have to possess far more territory than merely the straits

themselves. It would be necessary for that power to possess at least

the coasts of Asiatic Turkey, because only in that way could it
provide the necessary air cover for its ships going from the Aegean
to the Eastern Mediterranean.

Some of these points will come up

again later so I shall not unduly stress them at the present moment.
·' .

The country, Turkey, with which I'tn dealing this morning

is by present day count a small country. It has approximately the

same area as the two American states of California and Montana.

The area is about two hundred and ninety four thousand square
miles, and those two states are a little bit larger than that.

It has

very much the same topography. If you look at the map, you'll

realize that all of the coast of Turkey is mountainous, that the en
tire peninsula is surrounded by a wall of mountains, and on the

seaward side of those mountains there are a certain number of

plains, for the most part small plains, and in many cases very bad

ly connected with the interior of the country.

Only one of the

major sea-c�asts of Turkey has any good ports in it.

On the en

tire northern coast, on the Black Sea, there is not one single port

which could accommodate a naval vessel of any importance what

19

soever.

There is a great dearth even of beaches which could be

used for beach landings.

The northern coastal range of mountains

starting with Mount Olympus, which rises to a height of eighty four

hundred feet, continues to rise in height all the way along, up to the
Caucasus peaks, thirteen to fourteen thousand feet high.

Of course

the final high point of the country is Mt. Ararat which is ap
proximately seventeen thousand feet in height.
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From Istanbul, in the Bosphorus, down to the southwestern
corner of the peninsula you have a great succession of very fine
natural ports. There is only one developed port (and when I say
developed, I use the word with reservation) and that is the partial
ly developed port of Izmir, formerly called Smyrna.
On the southern coast again you have a mountain range
running right along the shore, and no developed ports whatever un
til you get down to Alexandretta (which the Turks call Iskender'."
un) in the extreme south corner-the southern extension of
Turkey.·

Now you realize from looking at the map that the mass of
the population is in the Aegean river valleys which are very fertile.
This is the region of Smyrna figs and Smyrna raisins. There is also a
. thick population along the Black Sea coast, in spite of the fact that
there is only a small amount of arable ground. That is because this
region is the only region in Turkey which has a very heavy rain
fall. In the extreme eastern part of the Black Sea coast you have a
rainfall such as you have in Sitka, Alaska-extremely heavy rain
fall with rain practically every day.
The communcations from the coasts to the interior of Turkey
are, by modern reckoning, very poor at every point, but the best
communications that .do exist are rail communicatons and we have
these running in from the port of Alexandretta, then through the
Cilician plain and through the great Taurus mountain range up
into the central plateau. Between Mersin on the Cilician coast and
Smyrna there is no railway reaching the sea. Between Smyrna and
Istanbul, there is no other railway connecting a port with the in
terior. Along the Black Sea coast there are two railways running
from the coast inland. One starts at Zonguldak, which is the area
in which Turkish .coal is produced. Here is a very sizeable coal

18
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol2/iss7/3

4

Wright: Turkey

RESTRICTED

field, with a very adequate quality of bituminous coal. The rail
way runs from there up to the capital of the country, high on the
interior plateau at Ankara. A second railway starting from Sam
sun, the great tobacco port on the Black Sea, connects with the
internal system of railways which form a sort of very loose net
around practically the whole country.
You realize, then, that this peninsula, surrounded by
mountains on every side, with narrow coastal plains, with few
communications with the interior, with very few ports of any con
sequence, is not what you would call exactly an attractive place on
which one could1and forces in the face of opposition. Nevertheless,
unattractive as it is, it's an area which must be studied. It must
be studied, basically because of the position which it occupies in
the world. Turkey is a finger pointing westward. It lies at the
point where Asia and Europe meet; it lies surrounded by seas;
it has as central a location in the geography of the world as any
country you could mention. It's not marginal, it isn't merely on
the edge of the Asiatic continent. It is the link which joins the
Asiatic continent to Europe which is, itself, nothing more than
a peninsula of the vast mass of Asia.
You know your maps, I'm sure, as well as I, so it's hardly
appropriate for me to enlarge too much on this fact. But I think
it's well to call your attention to the increase in the importance
of this territory as a result of modern developments in warfare. As

I pictured it to you, it is obviously a sort of a natural fortress. Not
only is it surrounded by mountains, but it is large enough to have
within that wall of mountains plenty of room for the building of
airfields-for the servicing of armies. In other words, it is a big
enough fortress to serve as a base of operations in any direction
and the directions which are attractive are very obvious.
Let me look at it first of all from the Kremlin; it is very

19
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obvious that one of the most important things we have to do is use
our imagination and put ourselves in the position of the people
with whom we may have violent disagreements. From the point
of view of the Kremlin, here is this potentially great fortress,
lying about two hundred miles from Russian territory across the
Black Sea. Not just any Russan territory, but the industrial heart
of Russia, built around the Donets coal basin. That two to three
hundred miles is no distance at all from the point of view of mod
ern bombing, as you are very well aware. Not only is that a very
vulnerable part of Russia which would be in danger of attack if
Turkey were in unfriendly hands, but, no further away from
Turkish territory and on the western shore of the Caspian Sea
is the greatest of the existing Russian oil fields, the great Baku. oil
field. It isn't producing what it did a few years ago, but, so far
as we know, it is still the major producing oil field of Russia. These
are very vital objectives, and I think it is very apparent, there
fore, why the Soviet Union is anxious to make sure that Turkey
is not being used as the base for an attack, nor in a position to be
used as a base for an attack, on the Soviet Union. And, pushing
that just a little bit further, it is also clear why it would be a.
great advantage to Russia if Turkey were in Russia's possession,
a satellite state, or under Russian domination. Because, just
as bombing planes could operate from Turkish territory, just as
navies could operate through the straits into the Black Sea (as they
did in the Crimean War-the one case in modern times in which
Russia was successfully invaded)-by the same token, this fort
ress, being just as defensible from the south and east as it is from
the north and west, could be the base for large scale air, land,
and sea operations.
It's a bit farther from Turkey to the Persian Gulf and its
great reservoir of oil (at least 40% of the world's known oil sup
ply is in that area) but it's not beyond effective bombing range
20
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of Turkish territory. The Mosul oil field is practically in sight of
the Turkish frontier (I must say, within sight of a highly mount
ainous area with very little land on which airfields could be built,
but nevertheless within easy range of other areas from which air
attacks might be mounted).
The possession, then, of this territory by either of two op�
posing world powers (the Soviet Union or the United States)
would be a peril to the other. And I think it's only fair to follow
our imagination a little further and say that the policies of the
United States with respect to Turkey must be governed to a con
siderable degree by the foreseeable reactions to this or that move
which we can expect the RussiaI).s to have. Consequently you
are brought to this conclusion: if the United States embarked on
a policy of the kind of imperialism which we called "old fashioned,"
and undertook, through annoyance with the inefficiency of the
native inhabitants or for some other reason, to take over and op
erate Turkey, all Russian statesmen and strategists would have
a completely legitimate feeling that we were threatening their se
curity. Therefore, it is obviously appropriate that we should make
every effort, while maintaining our security in this area, not to
push our policy to the point where the Soviet planners and strate
gists would have legitimate grounds to feel that we were aiming
a dagger at their heart (an expression which they would no doubt
come to use).
I'm happy to say that, up to the present time, the policy
which the United States has followed with respect to Turkey has
been along the lines which I have just explained. The policy of
the United States has been to form what is, in effect, an informal
alliance with Turkey. It is an alliance which doesn't require that we
send military forces to this or that point, under this or that contin
gency, but an alliance in the sense that we are confident of Turkey's
21
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being on our side in any dispute between ourselves and the Soviet
Union. Therefore it is to our interest to have this small country in a
position to defend itself against attack which might come from the
Soviet Union. Consequently, the couple of hundred million dollars of
aid to Turkey which the United States is paying, is being used to
build up the defensive strength of the Turkish Republic. Some
of it is being used for longer range, and some for shorter range
purposes.

One of the most long range is the appropriation which is
being spent on the improvement of Turkish road communications
and transportation. There, our representatives have been able to
persuade the Turkish government to spend the ten million dollars
appropriated almost entirely for road making machinery; whereas
the Turkish government itself, from its own local resources, is pro
viding the labor and the material necessary for the construction
of a system of highways. This program will not make Turkey a
country like Rhode Island or Connecticut from the point of view
of roads, but will represent several hundred percent improvement
in the existing situation.
So our relations with Turkey amount, at the present time, to
an informal alliance. Now, if Turkey is an ally, it's very fair to ask,
"What kind of an ally?" I'll give you an example of what I mean.
In 1914, Russia had an ally in Serbia, and the adventurous policy
which was followed by the Serbian government led to a world war
in which the Russian empire was destroyed. We, in our relations
with Turkey, are in a somewhat similar position: here is a small
nation which is our ally; what kind of an ally? If that ally follows
an adventurous policy, the first thing we know we are going to find
ourselves involved in its quarrels with its neighbors-quarrels
which may not be of any particular int.erest to us, just as it was
of no immediate importance to the Russian government in 1914
to have the Archduke of Austria assassinated in Sarajevo.
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I'm merely bringing this out to show you how dangerous the
small ally can be to the greater ally. As far as Turkey is concerned,
the most important fact in this connection is that the men who are
ruling Turkey at the present time are ruling that small country
with the wisdom which they acquired in the process of losing a
large empire. The statesmen of Turkey are not peasants; they
are not newcomers on the scene of international politics; they, as
they would put it themselves, are "well cooked". They know their
business: they know what works in international politics; and they
know what doesn't work. They are very well aware that the worst
thing they could do, granted the informal nature of their alliance
with the United States, would be to stir up unnecessary friction
with their neighbors {particularly with the Soviet Union). In our
own country, with our foreign policy dependent upon public opin
ion-not just on the decisions of a few people in positions of high
command-we might be faced by the question "Will we save this
small ally from its own mistakes; will we go to war in a cause for
which we have very little sympathy?" Well, you and I know what
the answer would be. Under those circumstances, the United
States wouldn't go to war; the American people are not that kind of

warmongers. They've been accused of it from the other side of the
Atlantic and the Urals, but they are not that kind of war makers.
Fortunately the men who are operating the Turkish. state are fully
aware of this, and they are determined to follow a policy with

respect to their greater and smaller neighbors which is one hun
dred percent "correct" in the diplomatic sense. They are not going
to start any unnecessary rows.

What are the aims and policies, the resources and population
of the Turks? They believe, rightly or wrongly, that they have a
country capable of supporting a much larger population than is at

present in Turkey, and at a much higher standard of living than
they now enjoy. They want peace for survival, peace for develop-
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ment of their resources. I've used the word development, and I
think it should be defined a little more closely. What kind of de
velopment, what kind of ideals, do these people have before them,
of the society into which they want to develop? What kind of
nation do they want to be? A decision was reached by them
twenty-five years ago. At that time they chose between the so
'Ciety sponsored by Russia and the sort of society which Western
Europe and the United States represented. During the interven
ing years they have consistently maintained the same point of
view. What they want, as a people, is to become a nation like the
highly developed nations of Western Europe or like the United
States. They have no territorial ambitions at the present time.
They don't want to take any land from their neighbors. They want
to live, to survive in peace, to develop their resources, to work out
the many problems with which they are faced internally and be
come a nation as much like this country as they are able to become.
We are, to a certain extent, responsible for their having
this point of view. I hope that, since I was president of the Ameri
can colleges in Turkey, I may be allowed to do a little advertising
for a moment. The existence of American schools and colleges,
paid for by Americans (first by missionary-minded Americans and
later by the simple humanitarian type of benefactor and philan
thropist) has had a good deal to do with persuading the Turkish
people that they want to live the way Americans and British and
Western Europeans live.
Well, I've spoken again and again of the people. There are
about eighteen million people living in Turkey, and all of them
haven't been Turks. They have at present in their country, a num
ber of minorities. The one which is large enough to be significant,
amounting to a million and a half people out of the eighteen mil
lion, is the Kurdish minority. The Kurd tribesmen speak a language
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related to Persian. Each tribe has been an independent nation
ever since the beginning of history. They live in the territory
extending from a point near Alexandretta out to the Russian
frontier. They comprise about one million and a half people, living
mostly in the mountains. No previous Turkish government, in fact
no government of any kind, had ever subdued these people. Their
mountains were so rugged, and so high, and so miserably poor,
that it wasn't worth the investment in money and lives necessary
to subdue these people. The Turkish Republic, however, has sub
dued them, that is, all of those who live within Turkey . There are
considerable groups, half a million or more, living in Iran and Iraq.
But those living in Turkey are completely subjected at the present
time. They are not only subjected, but the Turks, with that wis
dom which they learned from losing an empire, having subdued
them in the military sense, having occupied every valley and every
hamlet in the whole country with considerable cost of life, then
said to the Kurds, "Now you are licked, you are Turks." It is the
same policy, in general, which the British government followed
in dealing with the Boers in South Africa, but proving in Turkey
much more effective tha:11 any one had thought possible.
I travelled through that entire country last summer; talked
with hundreds of people in the region, and I came away with the
impression that the one big minority problem of Turkey is licked
and that within a few years there won't be any people in Turkey
who consider themselves Kurds. The young men are all going
into the military service and they like it. They come back proud
of their service ribbons. They come back with the title of Sergeant,
which they wear throughout life. They tell the people in the
mountain villages in which the governments have forced them to
settle, "We are smarter than the Turks are; we should all go out
into Western Turkey and make our fortunes and then come back
here and live happily." They have come to think of themselves
as members of the Turkish community.
25
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There are other minorities; one consists of Greek-speaking
people, about one hundred thousand, all of whom live near or in
the city of Istanbul or Constantinople. An Armenian-speaking
minority live in the same area, and the eighty thousand or more
Jews in the country are scattered through a few of the larger
- cities. The Greeks, who are not noted for their love of Turks,
nevertheless regard conditions in Turkey today (and quite right
ly so) as much superior to conditions in Greece at the present
moment. They are not making any effort to leave, or making any
trouble in Turkey.
The Armenians are in an extremely difficult position. They
are not regarded as first-class citizens (any more than the Greeks
or Jews are) in this Moslem country, but there is not much they
can do about it, so they are adjusting themselves to a position
somewhat like that which the Negroes occupy in the United
States. A good many Armenians were encouraged by the Soviet
government to leave Turkey, to leave Syria, even . the United
States, and go to the Soviet Republic of Armenia. I was up
there in that region last summer (I don't mean on the Russian
side of it but on the Turkish side) and I saw what was happening.
A good many of these Armenians who have gone there as settlers
in the Soviet-Armenian republic, flee from that country; they flee
to Turkey for safety and security. If any of you know of the re..;
lations between Turks and Armenians, you'll realize that the
last place you would expect an Armenian to go, seeking security,
is Turkey. That, perhaps, will give you some idea of how terrible
conditions are within Soviet-Armenia.
I'll take a moment to tell you what these people say
these refugees. They say that on arrival at Batumi, on the Black
Sea coast, they are immediately sent to labor camps. The younger
children are separated and are sent to special schools; families are
broken up. The older people, whom the Soviet-Communists don't
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expect to be able to convert to whole-hearted Communism, are sent
to labor camps where they get a full ration only if they do a full
days work (and a full ration consists of bread and cabbage soup).
In the various shifts around the country, all their goods were
stolen from them. Several boasted, when they came into Turkey,
that they were wearing suits which they had stolen from the
Russian guards. Those who can do a good day's work get a full
ration; those who can't, get a half ration, and they die of starva
tion before long. A good many, who have enough ambition and
energy left, try to escape, and they escape into Turkey. When they
come to the frontier they find in most places a barbed wire fence
to hold them in, and sentry boxes one hundred to one hundred and
fifty meters apart with sentries who shoot anyone crossing the
frontier. But, as is usually the case in these authoritarian regimes,
the authorities can't trust their subordinates. And so another
organization, other than the sentries, rakes the soil between these
sentry posts every morning; rakes it so that it's smooth; then if
they find any foot prints there, they shoot the sentries. Now
the refugees who do get out, get out through that as well as all the
other controls inside the country. That gives you some idea of
what conditions must be like behind the frontier for these im
migrants.
I've spoken of the minority populations in Turkey. What
about the politics of Turkey? Now politics is the business of power
internally, within the country. What is the situation? Up until
two and one half years ago, Turkey was ruled by one party, a
monolithic party. It was ruled this way: the President of the Re
public was also President of the Party. As President of the Party,
he chose all the party's candidates for parliament. The members
of parliament, whom he had chosen, elected him President. That's
what you might call a complete circle; perhaps not a vicious one,
but nevertheless it's a complete circle. It was hard to distinguish
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. between the Ministry of the Interior, which controls the police,
and the officials of the party. The local governor in a province

was appointed by the central government in Istanbul, not elected.
Usually the local governor was also head of the local party or

ganization.

Two and one half years ago, Turkey was not as yet an in
formal ally of the United States. Turkey had the idea of becom
ing a Western country-Western in politics as well as in economy

and society. But the people who were in charge of the government
were not in a hurry to make any moves which would result in the

loss of their jobs.

They realized the status of General Franco in

his relations with the United States, and of a few other countries

with which alliance could not be contracted by the United States
government because of the bad press which they enjoyed as a result
of their having a fascist or semi-fascist type of regime. When the
President of Turkey and his advisers realized the situation, they
decided to move, more rapidly than they had planned, in the direc

tion of a genuine democratic system. And consequently you had
the emergence of a new party, the second party. This had been
tried a couple of times in the past, but the results had not been
happy for the people who tried it. This time the new party was
founded under the leadership of a former Prime Minister, with
the obvious approval and consent of the President of the Repub
lic. Shortly thereafter, there was a general election. In that
election the new party won only'about sixty members of the parlia
ment, whereas the old established party won over three hundred
members. The opposition party claimed that the elections were
finagled-that there was all kinds of skull-duggery practiced.
From what I was able to discover in talking to a great many
people last summer, in the big coastal cities, where there were
plenty of foreign observers around, the elections were absolutely
honest. As you went away from the coast, and left the foreign
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observers behind, there was increasing government police pressure
upon people to vote in favor of the party in power. Those of
you who have cruised around South American waters are very ·

familiar with the type of proceding which I am hinting at. The
government saw to it, in other words, that there wasn't too much
open scuffle, but that it was a good sized majority-in fact a very,
very effective majority indeed.

This has been done partly because of the aims of the Turk

ish government and people, partly because of their desire to have

a good press in the United States, in order to make alliance with
Turkey possible not only for American soldiers and sailors but for

the American man in the street.

And they are succeeding; the

process is going on, and I suspect that if you had an election

tomorrow the opposition party would perhaps not win the election,

but it would win a vastly larger number of the parliamentary

seats.

In Turkish politics, there is no argument on foreign pol

icy. The foreign policy of all parties is identical.

It calls for co

operation with the United States and the allies of the United

States, and for maintenance against every threat against the in

dependence of the country. ·

Perhaps I might say a word here as to the morale of the

Turkish people.

The best illustration I can think of came from

the newspaper yesterday.

One of the leading writers of Turkey

turned communist, was prosecuted and, when he was indicted, he

disappeared.

He was tried in absentia and condemned to three or

· four months in prison. (I might say that all known communists in
Turkey are lodged permanently at government expense, in prison.

There are very few of them; they are not a great burden to the
finances.)

This man disappeared and nothing was heard of him

until the police caught a man who made it his business to spirit

people away from Turkey to Bulgaria and vice-versa.

When they
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gave the usual third degree treatment to this gentleman, they dis
covered that he had killed this prominent writer. His story was
that the prominent writer had come to him, offered him money
to be taken over into Bulgaria. The brigand didn't know who his
customer was until he got very close to the frontier, and then he
said, "I realized suddenly that this was the wicked communist
writer. I may have had some faults in the past but no one can
claim that I'm not a patriotic Turk. Under these circumstances
. what could I do? I couldn't take this man to a foreign country,
where he could safely attack the fatherland, so I killed him."
Now if the brigands and thieves talk this way, it gives you some
idea of the force, of the determination, of these people to main
tain themselves as an independent nation. I might say it turned
out later, after this gentleman had received some more third de
gree, that the writer had exhibited a very large roll of paper money
which may have had· something to do with the murder.
I shall not go on further with this, but I'll ask you to be
lieve that the vast majority of these people, close to one hundred
percent, are united, completely united, in foreign policy. The dif
ferences between the political parties �re domestic differences about
the rate at which changes should take place, about the kind of
reforms that should be adopted, and so on.
Now let's tu:rn to this question, "What does Turkey expect
of its relations with the United States?" First of all they ex-.
pect to get supplies, and they are getting them. They ·have bought
largely war surplus material and· they got it very cheap indeed,
at least in the earlier shipments. They want arms for their Army
and Navy. Their Army is always going to be more important to
them than either their Navy or Air Force, because they do not
have the technical facilities, they don't have the industry to sup
port as complicated an instrument as either a navy or an air force,
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They can!-t build ships, they can't build airplanes and they can't
even repair them because of their lack of technological development.
What they expect of us in navy and air force is minimum weapons;
enough to put on a show. Of course the Navy men want bigger and
better ships, and they are always asking for them, but they don't
really expect to get anything bigger than a light cruiser. They know
that they couldn't make any real use of anything except destroyers,
submarines, gunboats and that sort of thing.
In the event of war between Turkey and the Soviet Union, the
Turks don't expect massive American forces to be sent to their aid.
They believe that their Army, which is obviously their strongest and
most numerous group, if supplied with weapons and ammunition,
and if provided with a moderate amount of air cover, will be able
to defend the heart of the country until the Russians are so busy
elsewhere that they will be able to stabilize the situation to Turkey's
advantage.
So if a crisis should arise, the first thing that the Turks
would expect of us would be air support. And it's quite obvious that
the kind of air support that they would expect, first of all, would be
the kind that could be delivered on carriers. Whether or not it's
feasible to send carrier aircraft there to operate in the Black Sea
or short of the Black. Sea, is a technical question which you gentle
men can answer much better than I..
What-would we expect from this informal alliance which
seems to exist? Turkey, as you see, wants to survive; that's the
motive all the way through. What we want, it seems to me, is first
of all to keep Turkey out of the hands of the Soviet Union. If Turkey
were occupied and held by the Soviets, the entire Eastern Mediter,
ranean would be shut off as far as we are concerned. It would per,
mit att!lck, both by air and by land, against the great oil-bearjng
. 3
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territories around the Persian Gulf and, although we could fight a
war without that oil, we don't have any allies in Europe who could
fight a war without the oil of the Persian Gulf. Therefore, our
first point is to keep Turkey within the area that we can do busi
ness with and preclude the Russians' taking it over.
More specific, what can we expect the Turks to do in a mili
tary way? Again there are technical questions which you'll know
better how to answer than I, but obviously it's going to take time;
time is going to be an important factor. Can we so prepare the
Turks that they could maintain themselves until such time as we
could bring forces to the Persian Gulf area (which is the most vital
of all these areas as far as I can see), so that we could bring forces
there adequate to defend them even if the Turks were wiped out?
That's a militarily important question, but evidentally we think
there is some possibility, militarily, or else we wouldn't be engaged
in sending arms to Turkey and in training Turkish officers and men
for defense.
Now another point, which I think is a very moot point but
one which we should discuss and understand clearly. Although we
have an arrangement with Greece, and an informal alliance with
Turkey, we have no formal or informal arrangement with Iran.
That leaves open the possibility that Iran might be used to outflank
Turkey, and a Russian attack might pass down toward the Persian
Gulf, first through Iran, and then Iraq to the Persian Gulf. If
there were a strong Turkish Army to the West, capable of receiving
extensive reenforcements, particularly in air power, I very much
doubt that any Russian commanding officer would want to send
forces down there within range of Turkish air fields.
Again there is the question: "Would the Turks be prepared
to let us use their airfields?" That too depends upon imponderable
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factors-the development of relations between the Turks and their
neighbors and between the Turks and ourselves. As matters are
now moving, I think it is not probable, but very possible, that we
would be in a position, through the arms which we have given to
Turkey, to make that outflanking movement too risky for the
Soviet to undertake.
Well, what are the hopes, what are the fears of the moment?
Obviously, from the Turkish point of view, the hope is that if they

are involved in a war with Russia, the only nation they fear, it will
be a war of a kind which will inevitably involve both Great Britain
and the United States.

As far as the United States is concerned,

we hope that our arming of Turkey will deter the Russians from
an attack, and that the contingency against which we are preparing
will never arise.

And finally, I think we have to face this question, "How

long will the type of arrangements, which we now have, last? Is it
just a short-term policy or is it a long-term policy?" Long term

policies depend upon community of interests between nations ; not
sentiments, but common interests. And, as I said earlier, our in
terest is not to occupy and administer Turkey, but to make Turkey
strong enough to occupy and administer herself and prevent any out

side power from taking over. We want an independent nation that
will add to our security in the Near East. It has to be Turkey, be
cause it is from Turkey that the oil, which is essential to our having
any effective allies, can be defended. So with this community of in

terest which exists, namely, survival of the Turks as an independent
nation (that interest being the same for them as for us) I think
that there is every ptospect of a long duration to the present type of
informal alliance.
And I can say this as a final word. Last summer I talked

with thousands of Turks, and with dozens of Americans, includ-

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1949

33

19

RESTRICTED

Naval War College Review, Vol. 2 [1949], No. 7, Art. 3

ing the heads of the Naval and Army missions in Turkey, the Am
bassadors and many of the Ministers of the Turkish Cabinet.

Thus far our people, military and civilian, have been operating
with a high degree of good sense and tact and understanding,
pushing ahead with their work, obviously not interested in taking
over Turkey as a conquered state. They have been doing all this
with such success that there is not yet any serious cloud on the
horizon as far as Turko-American relations are concerned.

Turkey is important because of its position,, because of its
morale, because of its point of view. It is important to the United
States and the United States is important to Turkey. Our informal
alliance is working and is working very well indeed, and I think we
have every reason to be satisfied with the present state of affairs.
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